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Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is 
their outcome efficient? This paper addresses these questions in the context of a Rothschild 
and Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an externality associated with the presence of 
adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality. Consequently, we show that 
while competitive equilibria always exist, they are not typically incentive efficient. However, 
as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities, markets for 
consumption rights can be designed so as to internalize the consumption externality due to 
adverse selection. With such markets competitive equilibria exist and are always incentive 
efficient. Moreover, any incentive efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive 
equilibrium. 
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We study competitive exchange economies with adverse selection. Agents have private
information regarding the probability distribution of their endowments. Firms oﬀer trade
contracts providing the agents with insurance against the realization of their individual
idiosyncratic uncertainty. Agents’ trades can be fully monitored, so that ﬁrms can en-
force exclusive contractual relationships.1 The agents’ private information is then the
only ’friction’ to the operation of markets. We analyze Walrasian equilibria where both
consumers and ﬁrms act as price takers.
We intend to address the following questions: Do Walrasian markets function orderly
in the presence of adverse selection? What are the properties of allocations attainable as
Walrasian equilibria of economies with adverse selection and exclusive contracts? And
in particular, Are Walrasian equilibria incentive eﬃcient?
Our analysis is motivated by the fundamental contribution of Prescott and Townsend
(1984), (1984b). They analyze Walrasian equilibria of economies with moral hazard
and with adverse selection when exclusive contracts are enforceable. While for moral
hazard economies they prove existence and constrained versions of the ﬁrst and second
theorems of welfare economics,2 they show that their approach cannot be successfully
extended to adverse selection economies. They conclude (p. 44) that “there do seem
to be fundamental problems for the operation of competitive markets for economies or
situations which suﬀer from adverse selection.”
In this paper we identify ﬁrst a special form of consumption externality which arises
in economies with adverse selection and exclusive contracts: the level of trades chosen
by agents of one type inﬂuences, via its eﬀect on the incentive compatibility constraints,
the admissible trades of agents of other types. In the spirit of the approach pioneered
by Arrow (1969) and Lindahl (1919) to the study of economies with externalities, we
then show that the introduction of appropriate markets for consumption rights allows
agents to internalize the externality induced by adverse selection and results therefore
in incentive eﬃcient competitive equilibrium allocations.
In economies with environmental externalities, eﬃcient allocations can be decentral-
ized by requiring that ﬁrms do not produce unless they acquire the appropriate amount of
”pollution rights”, which are traded in the market at competitive prices. Similarly, in the
adverse selection economies we consider, the decentralization of incentive eﬃcient allo-
cations requires that agents do not consume unless they acquire the appropriate amount
of ”consumption rights”. This link between the level of consumption and holdings of
1Exclusivity is clearly a strong assumption. It is nonetheless the benchmark case considered in
contract theory as well as in general equilibrium analyses of economies with asymmetric information, e.g.,
in Prescott-Townsend (1984). The properties of competitive equilibria when this condition is violated
and only non-exclusive contractual relationships are available are investigated in Bisin-Gottardi (1999).
2See also Bennardo-Chiappori (2003), Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (2002), and Kocherlakota (1998).
2rights induces agents to internalize the externality their own consumption imposes on
the economy in the presence of adverse selection. For instance, a higher level of con-
sumption by agents of a low risk type might exert a negative externality on agents of a
high risk type by tightening their incentive constraint. That is, a higher consumption
level by the low risk agents renders a higher level of consumption by the high risk agents
necessary to guarantee that they do not misreport their risk type and choose to consume
the same amount of the low risk agents. The low risk types will internalize this exter-
nality because at equilibrium they will have to buy, at a positive price, an amount of
consumption rights which appropriately increases with their own consumption level.
We call Walrasian equilibria with such market structure ALPT, for Arrow-Lindahl-
Prescott-Townsend. This expanded structure of markets allows to fully decentralize
incentive eﬃcient allocations. We show that ALPT equilibria exist and incentive con-
strained versions of the ﬁrst and second theorem of welfare economics hold. In other
words, we successfully replicate for adverse selection economies the results that Prescott-
Townsend (1984),(1984b) obtain for moral hazard economies, thereby oﬀering a solution
to the problem their papers opened.
Evidently, the implementation of the structure of markets which guarantees the de-
centralization of incentive constrained eﬃcient allocations in adverse selection economies
requires an enforcement mechanism which prevents agents from acquiring commodities
for their own consumption without acquiring also the appropriate amount of consump-
tion rights. However, we will argue that the implementation of markets for consumption
rights can be greatly simpliﬁed by designing an enforcement mechanism which operates
on insurance ﬁrms rather than directly on agents and by having consumption rights take
the simple form of the ‘right’ to trade in the market designated for the ‘low risk’ agents.
At equilibrium ﬁrms oﬀering contracts exclusively to ‘low risks’ would acquire the ‘right’
to do so from ’high risk’ agents at market-determined prices. When at equilibrium the
prices of the rights are positive an eﬃcient allocation is decentralized at which ‘low risks’
subsidize ‘high risks’ by compensating them for selling their ‘rights’ to trade in the ‘low
risk’ insurance market.
We also consider economies where the markets for consumption rights are not avail-
able. In this case, each agent is only able to trade claims to his own consumption. He
has then to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints with respect to the level of
trades chosen by the other types of agents, taken as given. We call Walrasian equilibria
with such structure of markets EPT, for Prescott-Townsend with externality. There are
no fundamental problems associated with this Walrasian equilibrium concept either. We
show that an EPT equilibrium always exists and provides a useful - and somewhat robust
- prediction to the outcome of competitive markets in such economies. Evidently, EPT
equilibria are not ensured to be incentive eﬃcient. However, they satisfy an appropri-
ately deﬁned notion of third best eﬃciency and the second welfare theorem also holds
for this equilibrium concept.
The analysis of this paper is developed for a simple insurance economy with adverse
3selection as the one considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). This constitutes a
very important test case for any equilibrium notion for adverse selection economies.
In addition, by exploiting the simple structure of the economy, we are able to clearly
illustrate the features and to provide a complete characterization of the various notions of
Walrasian equilibrium which we study. In particular, the allocation we obtain as unique
EPT equilibrium corresponds to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating candidate equilibrium
(this is so even for those parameter values for which Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) found
non-existence). On the other hand, ALPT equilibria might entail a nonzero level of
cross-subsidization, i.e., some degree of ’pooling’ among types.
The paper is organized as follows. The structure of the economy is presented in the
next section; incentive eﬃcient allocations are then characterized in Section 3. In Section
4, ﬁrst EPT equilibria and then ALPT equilibria are deﬁned, their existence established,
and their eﬃciency properties characterized. The proofs of the main results are collected
in the Appendix.3
2 The Economy
Consider an economy with adverse selection populated by a continuum of agents of two
diﬀerent types, b and g. Let ξ
b denote the fraction of agents of type b and ξ
g the fraction
of agents of type g in the population. We assume ξ
b,ξ
g > 0.
There is a single consumption good. Uncertainty enters the economy via the level of
the agents’ endowment and is purely idiosyncratic. There are two possible states, H,L,
for every individual, and his endowment when H (resp. L) is realized is ωH (resp. ωL).
Let πi
s be the probability that individual state s ∈ S ≡ {H,L} is realized for an agent of
type i ∈ {g,b}. These random variables are independently distributed across all agents
and identically distributed across agents of the same type.
Each agent is privately informed about his type. On the other hand, the realization
of individual states is commonly observed.
With no loss of generality, let ωL < ωH and 0 < πb
H < π
g
H < 1. It follows that state
H corresponds to a high endowment realization and type b is the ‘high-risk’ type.
The preferences of each agent are described by a von Neumann-Morgernstern utility
function with type independent utility index u : R+ → R+ deﬁned over consumption in









Assumption 1. Endowments are always strictly positive for all agents: ωL,ωH > 0.
3A complete presentation of the proofs of all other results in the paper, as well as some additional
discussions of our results, can be found in Bisin and Gottardi (2005).
4Preferences are strictly monotonic, strictly concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
and limx→0 u′(x) = ∞.
Note that the economy is the same as the insurance economy with adverse selection
considered by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
3 Incentive Eﬃcient Allocations
Let ω ≡ {ωH,ωL} ∈ R2
+. zi ≡ (zi
H,zi
L) ∈ R2 denotes then the net transfers in each
state to type i ∈ {g,b}. The consumption level induced by such transfers is xi = ω + zi.
A (symmetric) feasible allocation is then described by a pair of net transfers {zg,zb}

















where the purely idiosyncratic nature of the uncertainty and the Law of Large Numbers
have been used to take the sum of the net transfers of the commodity contingent on each
individual state, weighted by their probability.





































Deﬁnition 1 An allocation {zg,zb} is incentive eﬃcient it is feasible, incentive com-
patible (i.e., satisﬁes ((1-3)) and if there does not exist another allocation {ˆ zg, ˆ zb}, also
feasible and incentive compatible, such that Ub  
ω + ˆ zb 
> Ub  
ω + zb 
and Ug (ω + ˆ zg) >
Ug (ω + zg), with at least one inequality being strict.4
For the simple adverse selection economy under consideration, Prescott and Townsend
(1984) have provided a complete characterization of the set of incentive eﬃcient con-
sumption allocations.5 At any incentive eﬃcient allocation at least one of the two types
4As shown by Prescott and Townsend (1984) (see, also, Cole (1989)), in the presence of asymmetric
information it may be desirable to expand the commodity space so as to allow for random allocations
of contingent commodities, or lotteries over consumption bundles. This is not the case for our simple
adverse selection economy, for which allocations involving nondegenerate lotteries are always suboptimal
(see Prescott and Townsend (1984)). To keep the notation simpler, deﬁnitions are then stated for the
case of non random allocations.
5See also Crocker and Snow (1985) and Jerez (2003).
5of agents’ is fully insured (has a deterministic consumption bundle). Incentive eﬃcient
allocations can then be classiﬁed according to which type of agent is fully insured.
Consider ﬁrst the incentive eﬃcient allocations where the agents of type b are fully
insured. At such allocations the type g agents are only partially insured, that is, their
consumption is higher in state H than in state L. The level of insurance provided to
agents of type g is in fact limited by the incentive constraint requiring that agents of type
b prefer zb to zg, as in (3) above. Agents of type b are instead fully insured because the
other incentive constraint is not binding. Allocations in this class can be parameterized
by the level of consumption of type b agents, or equivalently by the expected value of





obtained when the expected net transfer to agents of type b is zero is the separating
allocation induced by Rothschild and Stiglitz separating pair of contracts, illustrated in
Figure 1.
The minimum level of the expected net transfer to type b agents which is compatible
with incentive eﬃciency may turn out to be strictly positive. This occurs in particular
when the fraction ξ
g of agents of type g is large enough. In this case the Rothschild
and Stiglitz separating allocation is not incentive eﬃcient: the utility of type g agents
is increased if they make a positive subsidy to type b’s consumption, as the subsidy
relaxes their binding incentive constraint and this more than compensates the cost of
the subsidy.
At incentive eﬃcient allocations where the agents of type b are fully insured, the
higher is the expected value of the net transfer to agents of type b, the weaker is the
incentive constraint (3), and hence the greater the amount of insurance that can be
provided to agents of type g. There exists then also a maximum level of the expected
net transfer compatible with the incentive eﬃciency of allocations in this class, at which
(3) becomes non binding. At the allocation corresponding to this level both types of
agents are fully insured and consume the same amount. This is the pooling allocation
induced by Rothschild and Stiglitz pooling contract, illustrated in Figure 2. No incentive
constraint binds at this allocation, and Pareto eﬃciency also obtains.
The second class of incentive eﬃcient allocations has the property that type g agents
are fully insured. Agents of type b are then overinsured, that is, their consumption is
higher in state L. The extent by which this happens is determined by the incentive
constraint requiring that agents of type g prefer zg to zb, as in (2). The characterization
of incentive eﬃcient allocations when agents of type g are fully insured is symmetric to
the characterization obtained above when agents of type b are fully insured. Allocations
can now be parameterized by the per capita level of the expected net transfer type g





As in Rothschild and Stiglitz, the pooling and the separating allocations will play a
central role in our analysis.
64 Walrasian Equilibria
Various competitive equilibrium concepts have been used in the analysis of adverse
selection economies with exclusive contracts. The standard strategic analysis of such
economies, due to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), considers the Nash equilibria of a
game in which insurance companies simultaneously choose the contracts they issue. The
competitive aspect of the equilibrium is captured by allowing the free entry of insurance
ﬁrms. (Diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the game among insurance companies, for instance
where dynamic reactions to new contract oﬀers are allowed, have been considered in
the literature e.g., by Wilson (1977), Riley (1979), Hellwig (1987); see also Maskin and
Tirole (1992).)
Our approach consists instead in studying Walrasian equilibrium concepts, where
both agents and insurance ﬁrms act as price takers in competitive markets. At equi-
librium a price is quoted for all possible contracts. We consider the case where agents’
trades are fully observable, so that exclusive contracts can be implemented. Following
the approach used by Prescott and Townsend (1984) for moral hazard economies, we
model exclusivity of contracts by imposing incentive compatibility directly as a con-
straint on the set of admissible trades of every agent. Prices are then indexed by the
agent’s declared type and linear over such restricted domain.6
Diﬀerently from the case of moral hazard economies, with adverse selection each
incentive compatibility constraint relates the consumption levels of the two types of
agents. As we see from (2-3), when agents of one type vary their consumption, this aﬀects
the set of values of consumption of the other type that satisﬁes incentive compatibility.
Thus, when the incentive compatibility constraints are imposed the set of contracts that
agents of one type can trade depends on the trades of the agents of the other type: an
externality arises in the speciﬁcation of the set of admissible trades of each agent.
Our ﬁrst contribution is to show that once the presence and the nature of the external-
ity in adverse selection economies with exclusive contracts is clearly identiﬁed, Walrasian
equilibria can be deﬁned and their properties analyzed as in other competitive economies
with externalities in consumption.
We will consider ﬁrst the notion of EPT equilibrium, where each agent takes as given
the level of trades made by the other types, i.e. the externality is not internalized. Next,
the notion of ALPT equilibrium will be examined, where markets allowing to internalize
the externality are introduced. We will show that, in contrast to the strategic approach
by Rothschild and Stiglitz, Walrasian equilibria always exist. We will also characterize
equilibrium allocations and study their welfare properties.
6An alternative way of modeling exclusive contractual relationships consists in allowing for non-linear
price schedules for contracts. In this case suitable ’reﬁnements’ restricting admissible equilibrium prices
are necessary to select between the large set of equilibria one obtains; see Gale (1992), (1996) and Dubey,
Geanakoplos, Shubik (1995).
74.1 EPT Equilibria
Each agent can trade, at linear prices, claims contingent on the realization of his indi-
vidual uncertainty as well as on his declared type. Let qi,s ∈ R+ be the unit price at
which any agent who claims to be of type i ∈ {g,b} can trade the consumption good for
delivery in his individual state s ∈ S, q ≡ {qg,H,qg,L,qb,H,qb,L} ∈ R4
+. To ﬁx notation,
note that here and in what follows a subscript i ∈ {g,b} denotes the type declared by
the agent, while a superscript denotes his actual unobservable type.
The set of admissible trades in such markets is restricted then by imposing incentive
compatibility constraints. More precisely, the speciﬁcation of the set of admissible trades
of every agent is constructed as follows. The agent has to choose a vector z ≡ {zg,zb} ∈
R4, where zi ≡ {zi,H,zi,L} denotes the net trades made in the market where agents who
declare to be of type i ∈ {g,b} trade. Every agent can claim to be of type g and trade in
the market designated for the type g at the prices qg). Alternatively, he can claim to be
of type b and trade in the market designated for b at the prices qb. If an agent declares
to be of type g and hence trades in the market for g, i.e., if he chooses zg  = 0, then he
cannot trade in the market for b and he must choose zb = 0. Moreover, his net trades
in the market for g have to be incentive compatible with respect to the net trades made
in the market by agents who claim to be of type b, taken as exogenously given; we will
denote such trades by ¯ zb ≡ (0, ¯ zb). Type b agents must then prefer ¯ zb at least weakly to
zg.7 Symmetric restrictions hold if the agent chooses instead to trade in the market for
the b types, i.e., zb  = 0: type g agents must prefer ¯ zg to zb, where ¯ zg ≡ (¯ zg,0).
The set of admissible net trades for each agent is then deﬁned as follows:
Z(¯ zg,¯ zb) =

   
   
z + (ω,ω) ∈ R4
+ :
∀i ∈ {g,b}, zi  = 0 =⇒ zj = 0 for j  = i and
 
s∈S πj





   
   
(4)
It depends on the level of trades made in the market ¯ zg, ¯ zb via the incentive compatibility
constraints imposed in the speciﬁcation of this set; thereby the externality.















7It is not explicitly required that type g agents prefer zg to ¯ zb, as in the ﬁrst of the two incentive
constraints appearing in the deﬁnition of incentive constrained allocations, (2). Such constraint would
in fact be redundant. Each agent trading in the market for g will always choose his most preferred
allocation. Therefore, he will choose an allocation that he prefers to ¯ zb if such an allocation is available.
But at equilibrium this will always be the case since type g’s incentive constraint (2) is imposed to the
problem of agents trading in the market for b and at equilibrium we require ¯ zb to be the actual choice
made by agents trading in market b.
8s.t.
q   z ≤ 0
In addition to consumers there are ﬁrms who supply insurance contracts, deﬁned by
purchases and sales of claims contingent on the realization of the individual uncertainty
and the agents’ declared type. Moreover, ﬁrms can construct aggregates - or ’pools’ - of
such contracts and transform them into riskless claims by the Law of Large Numbers.
Let y ≡ {yg,H,yg,L,yb,H,yb,L} denote the vector describing the supply of net trades of
contingent commodities, on a per capita basis. Firms are then characterized by the
following constant returns to scale technology:









The technology requires that ﬁrms oﬀer individual contracts which are self-ﬁnancing in
the aggregate.




q   y (P EPT,f)
We restrict our attention here, and in what follows, to symmetric equilibria, where
all agents of the same type make the same choice.




, a production vector y, a price vector q, and a pair (¯ zg,¯ zb) such that:
(i) for each i ∈ {g,b}, zi solves the optimization problem (P EPT,i) of consumers of type
i, given (q,¯ zg,¯ zb);
(ii) y solves the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problem (P EPT,f), given q;




i ≤ y, (5)
(iv) the level of trades in each market, taken as given by agents, is consistent with the
agents’ actual choice:
¯ zg = z
g
¯ zb = z
b
Note that condition (iv) requires that at equilibrium each agent chooses to declare
his true type: agents of type g choose to trade in the market designated for g while
agents of type b prefer to trade in the market designated for b.
9The formulation of the agents’ set of admissible trades in (P EPT,i), together with the







incentive compatible, that is, it satisﬁes (2-3).
The presence of incentive compatibility as a restriction on consumers’ admissible
trades can be equivalently interpreted, rather than literally as consumers ‘self-imposing’
such constraints, as a restriction on the set of contracts ﬁrms can oﬀer to consumers.8
The ﬁrms’ choice of y can in fact be viewed as the choice of the contract to oﬀer the
agents, as insurance ﬁrms do in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), except that in our analy-
sis ﬁrms are price-takers. Even though the set Y of contracts that are admissible for the
ﬁrms is quite large, only incentive compatible contracts will be oﬀered at equilibrium:
supply has in fact to equal demand, and agents’ demand is subject to the incentive com-
patibility constraints. Hence the set Y of admissible contracts for the ﬁrms could have
been restricted, without aﬀecting the results, by imposing the incentive compatibility
constraints as in (4). In this formulation a ﬁrm could only oﬀer a contract in the market
designated for the type g agents if type b agents preferred ¯ zb to the net trades prescribed
by the contract, and similarly for contracts to be oﬀered in the market for b.
We are able to completely characterize the EPT equilibria of the economy under
consideration. First of all, it is easy to verify that the speciﬁcation of the set of admissible
trades in (4) ensures that each agent will choose to trade in the market designated for
his own type. Moreover, the constant returns to scale property of the ﬁrm’s technology,
which characterizes the set Y of technologically feasible contracts ﬁrms can oﬀer, implies
that a solution of the ﬁrms’ maximization problem P EPT,f requires prices q to be fair:
Lemma 1 At an EPT equilibrium, prices of contingent commodities have to be ”fair”:
qi,s = π
i
s, i ∈ {g,b},s ∈ S (6)
If in fact prices were not fair, e.g. πb
L > qb,L,πb
H ≤ qb,H, ﬁrms could achieve unbound-
edly large positive proﬁts by selling commodity (b,H) and buying (b,L).
At an EPT equilibrium, therefore, agents of type b face fair prices and, we can show,
they face no binding incentive constraint. They will then fully insure and choose the net
trades corresponding to b’s component of the separating allocation, zb,S = xb,S − ω.
The set of budget feasible and incentive compatible consumption levels of type g
agents at the equilibrium prices is illustrated in Figure 1. It corresponds to the shaded
area lying below the lower contour of the indiﬀerence curve Ub passing through xb,S and
the fair odds line for type g which by Lemma 1 is the budget constraint in the market
for g. The preferred point by agents of type g in this set, xg,S, is the consumption level
induced by type g’s net trades at the separating allocation. We conclude that the only
EPT equilibrium of the economy is Rothschild and Stiglitz separating allocation.
8See also Jerez (2003) on this point.
10Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, a unique EPT equilibrium allocation always exists
and it coincides with Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation.
Thus, Rothschild and Stiglitz’s pooling allocation is never an EPT equilibrium. To
understand why, it is important to note at the outset that this allocation is incentive
compatible and hence it is included in the commodity space. Nonetheless no vector of
prices supports the pooling allocation as an EPT equilibrium. As shown in Lemma 1, in
equilibrium prices have to be fair. At fair prices, though, the pooling allocation is not
budget feasible for the type b agents and hence it cannot be an equilibrium. This is just
a consequence of the fact that the pooling allocation requires cross-subsidization from
types g to types b and cross-subsidization requires prices not to be fair.9
We have shown that the separating allocation is always an EPT equilibrium. For
the same economy Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) ﬁnd instead robust instances where
the separating allocation is not an equilibrium (and no other allocation is). When all
agents prefer the pooling allocation to the separating one, their argument goes, the
latter is not an equilibrium because the introduction of a pooling contract constitutes a
proﬁtable deviation, since all agents will acquire it. To understand why this argument
does not apply in our context, we should point out that in a Walrasian equilibrium
all technologically feasible contracts y ∈ Y are simultaneously available for trade in a
competitive market. This includes the pooling, the separating, as well as the contracts
which agents of type g prefer to the pooling. It is indeed the availability of contracts
which ”skim” agents of type g from the pooling which implies that the pooling is never
a proﬁtable deviation to the separating at a Walrasian equilibrium.10
4.1.1 Welfare Properties of EPT Equilibria
As we noticed earlier, when the fraction ξ
b of type b agents is suﬃciently small the
separating allocation is not incentive eﬃcient. The characterization of EPT equilibria
obtained in Theorem 1 therefore reveals that the ﬁrst welfare theorem does not hold,
that EPT equilibria may not be incentive eﬃcient. This should not come as a surprise:
our formulation of Walrasian equilibria in adverse selection economies, EPT, clearly
identiﬁes an externality, not internalized by the structure of markets considered, which
may preclude the incentive eﬃciency of equilibrium allocations.
9The pooling allocation would be budget feasible for both types if qg = qb. But at these prices,
as argued for Lemma 1, ﬁrms could achieve unboundedly large positive proﬁts by selling commodity
(g,L) and buying (b,L), i.e., by selling only insurance to the g types. In other words, ﬁrms could make
positive proﬁts by ’breaking’ the pooling and introducing some separation, as in the argument used by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to explain why the pooling allocation is not supported as an equilibrium.
10This is not unrelated to Wilson (1977)’s and Riley (1979)’s critique of the strategic notion of
equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976); see Bisin and Gottardi (2005) for an extended discussion
of this point.
11It is useful however to examine more closely what is the precise source of the inef-
ﬁciency. As shown by Lemma 1, at an EPT equilibrium the prices of contracts traded
by each type are always fair. Thus at equilibrium there is never cross-subsidization
across types. We show next that such lack of cross-subsidization is clearly responsible
for the possible ineﬃciency of EPT equilibria and moreover it is in fact the only source
of ineﬃciency. EPT equilibrium allocations are eﬃcient within the restricted subset of
allocations which are incentive eﬃcient and satisfy an additional condition requiring that
there is no cross-subsidization across types.11 Thus the following third best version of
the ﬁrst welfare theorem holds:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, all EPT equilibrium allocations are eﬃcient within
the restricted set of feasible allocations which are incentive compatible and, in addition,






s) ≤ 0, i ∈ {g,b}. (7)
On the other hand, the second welfare theorem holds for the present structure of
markets: any incentive eﬃcient consumption allocation can be decentralized as an EPT
equilibrium with transfers. Let (tH,tL) ∈ R2 denote the vector of state contingent
transfers to the agents. Note that transfers are same for both types since types are
private information. Thus, the budget constraint of an agent who chooses to trade in
the market for i, in the presence of the transfers (tH,tL), is:
 
s∈S
qi,s (zi,s − ts) ≤ 0, (8)













Proposition 2 Let (zg,zb) be an arbitrary incentive eﬃcient allocation. Under As-
sumption 1 there exists a set of feasible transfers (tH,tL) ∈ R2 such that (zg,zb) is the
allocation obtained at the EPT equilibrium of the economy under consideration when
each agent receives a transfer (tH,tL), that is, when each agent’s budget constraint is as
in (8).
Figure 3 illustrates this result. For the given initial endowment ω, the EPT equi-
librium is the corresponding separating allocation
 
zi,S 
i=g,b. Consider now the class of
incentive eﬃcient allocations characterized by full insurance of type b agents and partial
11See Gale (1996) for a similar result for competitive equilibria of adverse selection economies with
fully nonlinear price schedules.
12insurance of type g. They have the property that the consumption level of type g sat-
isﬁes the incentive constraint of type b with equality, i.e., the consumption level of type
g lies on type b’s indiﬀerence curve Ub. Take an arbitrary incentive eﬃcient allocation
(zi)i=g,b in this class. Transfers t = (tH,tL) can be constructed as in the Figure so that
the EPT equilibrium (the separating allocation) associated to the endowment ω+t is in
fact (zi)i=g,b. The formal proof is contained in the Appendix.
4.2 ALPT Equilibria
In the deﬁnition of EPT equilibria the set of admissible trades of each agent is restricted
by incentive compatibility constraints which relate the level of net trades an agent can
make in a market to the net trades made in the other market. This fact generates, as
we noticed, an externality in consumption. To decentralize incentive eﬃcient allocations
in the adverse selection economies under consideration it is then necessary to introduce
markets where agents can trade the ‘commodity’ which generates the externality. This
is in accord with the approach proposed by Arrow (1969) and Lindahl (1919) for general
economies with externalities and public goods, approach which is adopted in the design of
markets for trading pollution rights (see Ledyard and Szakaly (1994)). We will refer then
to the competitive equilibrium notion we obtain as Arrow-Lindahl-Prescott-Townsend
(ALPT) equilibrium.
The design of a structure of markets for consumption rights which allows to decentral-
ize incentive eﬃcient allocations as Walrasian equilibria contains three main components:
a deﬁnition of the agents’ choice set which includes holdings of consumption rights, an en-
forcement mechanism which speciﬁes exactly which ”rights” holding consumption rights
provides the agent with, and a speciﬁcation of the agents’ endowments of consumption
rights as well as of the technology to produce them. We discuss these three components
of the decentralization mechanism we design in the following, ﬁrst informally and then
more formally.
Consider an agent, say of type g. He has ﬁrst of all to choose in which market to
trade, either the market designated for type g agents or the market for types b. The
set of admissible net trades he will face in each market will be such as to induce him
to trade in the market designated for his own type, type g. In this market he will
trade contingent claims as well as consumption rights. To be able to realize any desired
level of consumption by trading contingent claims in the market for g types, the agent is
required in fact to hold an appropriate amount of consumption rights, or, more precisely,
of consumption rights for market g. This is the enforcement mechanism component of
the market design. It provides a link between consumption and holdings of consumption
rights with the objective of making the agent internalize the eﬀect of his consumption
on the incentive compatibility constraints of the other type: the higher the level of
consumption by agents of type g, the tighter is the incentive constraint which has to be
satisﬁed to prevent agents of type b to pretend to be of type g, and hence the higher the
13amount of consumption rights for market g a type g agent needs to hold.12 Only when
the price of consumption rights for market g is zero will the agent be free to choose his
trades of contingent claims in this market. In this case the enforcement mechanism does
not constrain his choice.
Finally, the supply of consumption rights needs to be speciﬁed. Consider the rights
for market g (the supply of rights for market b is symmetric). Both agents’ types are
assumed to be initially endowed with a certain quantity of rights for market g. In addi-
tion, the agents who choose to trade in the market designated for b produce an additional
amount of consumption rights for market g directly proportional to their net trades of
contingent claims. A higher level of net trades in market b in fact relaxes the type b’s
incentive constraint and hence makes the participation in the market for agents of type
g easier.13
We turn now to a formal description of the market design. Let z ≡ {zg,zb} ∈ R4 be,
as before, the vector of net trades of contingent claims, where zi ≡ {zi,H,zi,L} denotes
the trades of an agent in the market designated for type i ∈ {g,b}. An agent who chooses
net trades zg  = 0 in the market for g, eﬀectively declaring to be of type g, cannot trade
in the market designated for type b agents and must therefore choose zb = 0.
To be able to trade zg units in the contingent claims market for g and hence to
consume xg = ω+zg units, the agent must hold an amount χ(g) ≡ {χH(g),χL(g)} ∈ R2
+










su(ωs + zg,s), (9)
This speciﬁcation of the enforced link between the contingent trades in the market for
g and the holdings of consumption rights for market g guarantees that type b’s incen-
tive constraint is satisﬁed for the amount of rights held by the agent. Therefore, type
b′s incentive constraint is internalized by agents trading in the market designated for
type g agents. Symmetrically, agents trading in the market for b must hold an amount
(χH(g),χL(g)) of consumption rights so that type g’s incentive constraint is satisﬁed.
The total initial endowment of consumption rights for market g is ωξ
g. A fraction
(1−α) of this endowment is equally distributed among the agents trading in the market
for g, and the remaining fraction α is distributed to the agents trading in the market for
12The enforcement mechanism might be designed to operate on net trades rather than on consumption,
to allow agents to consume their own endowment without holding any rights. We avoid making this
distinction to keep simpler the presentation and the interpretation of the market mechanism.
13Arrow-Lindahl equilibrium concepts are sometimes criticized on the basis of the fact that the price
taking assumptions is inconsistent with individualized prices (as markets are too ’thin’); see for instance
Chari-Jones (2000). But in the economy considered here there is a continuum of agents of each type,
hence the presence of markets for consumption rights for each type is still consistent with price taking
behavior.
14Note that consumption rights for market g are thus denominated in units of type b’s consumption.
14b. Each agent trading in the market for g receives therefore (1−α)ω units of endowment





αω units of the same rights go to
each agent choosing to trade in the market for b. The distribution of consumption rights






αω units of consumption rights for market b.15 The constant
α conveniently parameterizes the distribution of the initial endowment of consumption
rights across agents. The higher is α, the lower is the initial endowment an agent has of
consumption rights for the market he chooses, and hence the higher will be the amount
of consumption rights an agent has to buy to be able to satisfy the constraints required
to consume and trade in this market (i.e., the greater the payment needed to internalize
the externality). We restrict α to be strictly positive: α ∈ (0,1].16.
The outstanding amount of consumption rights is not limited to the total initial
endowment distributed across the agents. Any trade of contingent claims to the con-
sumption good in one market, in fact, produces consumption rights for the other market.
More speciﬁcally, an agent choosing an amount zg of net trades in the market for g, for





zg of consumption rights for market b
that he can trade in the market. Let ζ(i) ≡ {ζH(i),ζL(i)} ∈ R2 denote the net trades of
consumption rights for market i ∈ {g,b}. An agent who chooses to trade in the market
for g holds then a total amount χ(g) of rights for consumption in the market for g equal






(αω + zg) + ζ(b). Since an agent has no beneﬁt from holding
consumption rights for a market other than the one where he chooses to trade, the net
sales of consumption rights for market b by an agent trading in the market for g will
typically equal the sum of the entire amount the agent is endowed and the amount he
produced. (Free disposal guarantees that the equilibrium prices of consumption rights
are non-negative.)
The presence of diﬀerent markets designated for each type requires, as already noted,
that the set of admissible trades is restricted so as to ensure that agents self-select in
the market for their own private type. The imposition of incentive constraints as (9)
ensures, as we shall see, that at equilibrium type b agents prefer to trade in the market
for b rather than choosing the same trades as the agents who selected to trade in the
market for g. This however is not enough to guarantee that they also do not prefer
other trades available in the market for g. To rule out such possibility an additional
constraint needs to be imposed.17 More speciﬁcally, we require that an agent cannot
15Note that in our formulation the endowment of consumption rights of each agent depends on his
choice of the market, i.e. on his implicit declaration of his type.
16This is needed to ensure that agents can ﬁnd some trades in the interior of their budget set at all
prices and hence to ensure the existence of an equilibrium.
17Such constraint is not needed, as we saw, in the case of EPT. On the other hand in ALPT, where
the incentive constraint faced by an agent in a market is required to hold with respect to the amount
15make trades in the market for g that only a type b agent would choose in that market,
as these trades would clearly signal that the agent has untruthfully declared his type to
be g. We exclude then as non admissible all those trades that only an agent of type b
would prefer to the trades that are made in this market, ¯ zg.This is condition (iii) in (10)
below. As we will see, this guarantees that at equilibrium agents always declare their
true type.
Summarizing, the set of admissible trades of every agent can be written as follows:
Z =

              
              
z + (ω,ω) ∈ R4
+; ζ ∈ R4 :
∀i ∈ {g,b}, zi  = 0 =⇒ zj = 0 for j  = i; and

















su(ωs + zi,s) <
 
s∈S πi




su(ωs + zi,s) <
 
s∈S πj
su(ωs + ¯ zi,s)
(10)
Condition (i) requires the non-negativity of the amount held of consumption rights,
both for the market which is chosen as well as for the other market, while (ii) and (iii)
are the incentive compatibility constraints restricting admissible trades. Condition (ii)
requires each agent choosing to trade in the market for type i to internalize the incentive
constraint of type j agents by means of his holdings of consumption rights for market i;
(iii) together with (ii) guarantees, as we argued, that agents declaring to be of type i,
and hence trading in the market designated for i, are in fact type i agents.
As we noted, in EPT the presence of the incentive compatibility constraints in the
speciﬁcation of the set of admissible trades generates an externality. On the other hand
in ALPT, where markets for consumption rights are introduced, no externality is induced
by the presence of those constraints, as in condition (ii). At the same time, condition
(iii) in Z, where ¯ zi appears, might seem to introduce once again an externality in the
speciﬁcation of the trading set and hence in the equilibrium notion. However, this is not
the case (and this is why, somewhat abusing notation, we have not indexed the set of
admissible net trades Z by ¯ z). Condition (iii) in fact guarantees that agents self-select in
the market designated for their own type, but does not aﬀect the equilibrium allocation
and prices in any other way: the condition rules in fact as non admissible in market i
the trades that only type j but not type i would make in this market. Formally, we
show (see Lemma A.1 in the proof of Theorem 2 in Bisin and Gottardi (2005)) that
of consumption rights chosen by the same agent rather than to the trades made by agents in the other
market, the set of admissible trades is larger and self-selection might not be induced in the absence of
this constraint. Rustichini and Siconolﬁ (2002) do not impose this constraint and ﬁnd that equilibria
may not exist.
16the set of equilibria of the economy under consideration, where the choice of any agent
is restricted to lie in Z, coincides with the set of equilibria of an artiﬁcial economy in
which the agents’ choice is only restricted by conditions (i) and (ii) of the deﬁnition
of Z, but agents of type i are required to trade in the market designated for type i.18
As a consequence, even though formally the set Z of feasible trades of every agent still
depends on the level of trades made in the market, we can argue that in this case the
externality does not matter,19 as the market for consumption rights allows to properly
internalize it.
The vector of prices at which consumption rights can be traded is p ≡ {pH(g),pL(g),
pH(b),pL(b)} ∈ R4
+, while the vector of prices of state contingent commodities is again
denoted as q ≡ {qg,H,qg,L,qb,H,qb,L} ∈ R4
+. The choice problem of an agent of type
















q   z + p   ζ ≤ 0
Firms are characterized by the same technology Y as in EPT and their choice problem
is also the same:
max
y∈Y
q   y (P ALPT,f)
We then have:
Deﬁnition 3 An ALPT equilibrium is a collection of net trades of contingent com-
modities and consumption rights for each type of consumer (zi,ζ
i)i∈{g,b}, a production
vector y, a price vector (p,q) and a pair (¯ zg, ¯ zb) such that:
(i) for each i ∈ {g,b}, (zi,ζ
i) is a solution of the optimization problem (P ALPT,i) of
type i consumers, given (p,q) and ¯ zj, j ∈ {g,b}
(ii) y solves the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization problem (P ALPT,f), given q;
18In this sense we can say that condition (iii) does not bind locally at equilibrium allocations. This
is not to say that it is redundant. We have in fact already noted (see footnote 17) that it is not. To
understand this we should observe that the maximization problem of each agent in our economy is not
convex, and includes in particular a binary choice regarding which market to trade in.
19This can be done formally. An alternative equivalent speciﬁcation of condition (iii), where no
reference to ¯ zi is made, is in fact possible, but at the cost of some non transparent notation and hence
we opted here for the speciﬁcation in (10).











(iv) the level of trades in each market, taken as given by agents, is consistent with the
agents’ actual choice:
¯ zj = z
j
j, j ∈ {g,b}
As the analogous condition in EPT, the consistency condition (iv) requires that at
equilibrium agents choose to declare their type truthfully. Also, the speciﬁcation of
the set of admissible trades Z, together with the consistency and the market clearing
conditions (iii) and (iv), implies that the level of consumption of type b agents, ω + zb,
equals the amount of consumption rights for market g held by type g, (1 − α)ω + ζ(g).








We can show20 that, for the economy under consideration, an ALPT equilibrium
always exists:21
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 1, an ALPT equilibrium always exists.
We derive next a characterization of ALPT equilibria. This allows us to better
understand how the markets for consumption rights we designed work and will also be
of use in our analysis of the welfare properties of ALPT.
First of all, in the proof of Theorem 2 in Bisin and Gottardi (2005) we show that
there is always an ALPT equilibrium where prices are as follows:
qi,s = π
i
s, s ∈ S, i ∈ {g,b} (11)
20Standard arguments cannot be directly applied here. We refer to Bisin and Gottardi (2005) for a
discussion of the methods used to establish existence, and for the proof of the result.
21In the working paper version of Prescott and Townsend (1984) the authors brieﬂy discuss a notion of
competitive equilibrium for adverse selection economies which is related to ALPT. In their formulation,
however, each type of agent chooses directly the consumption level of the other type rather than the
amount of consumption rights. In our context this is equivalent to the requirement that, e.g., the price
agents face for consumption rights for market g, p(g), is the same as the price that agents face for
consumption claims in the market for type b, qb. At these prices, the choices made by the two types of
agents in the two markets will typically not be consistent; that is, in our notation, ζ(g)+(1−α)ω  = zb+ω.
As a consequence, as Prescott and Townsend notice, an equilibrium will generally fail to exist.
18ps(g) = βπ
b
s, ps(b) = 0, s ∈ S (12)
for some β ∈ (0,ξ
b/ξ
g). The form of these equilibrium prices clearly illustrates how
incentive eﬃcient allocations are sustained as ALPT equilibria. The prices q at which
agents can trade the contingent claims for the consumption good are fair, as in EPT. But
then the type g agents have to pay a positive price to acquire the consumption rights for
market g needed to satisfy the required incentive compatibility constraint. Type b agents,
on the other hand, receive a positive revenue from the sale of these consumption rights.
Furthermore, the consumption rights for market b trade at a zero price. As a consequence,
agents of type b do not have to pay any cost to ensure the incentive compatibility of
their consumption, and agents of type g receive nothing from the sale of these rights. At
the equilibrium allocation obtained at the above prices, type b’s incentive constraint (3)
is binding, the consumption of the g agents exerts then a negative externality on type b
agents, and the positive equilibrium price of consumption rights for market g induces a
subsidy from agents of type g to agents of type b. Consumption rights for market b trade
at a zero price, on the other hand, because at equilibrium type g’s incentive constraint
(2) is not binding and hence the consumption of agents of type b generates no externality
on agents of type g.
Figure 4 below illustrates such an ALPT equilibrium. In particular, the shaded area
represents the set of admissible and budget feasible trades of contingent claims in the
market designated for type g, at an ALPT equilibrium. It is typically larger than the
corresponding set in EPT, depicted by the shaded area in Figure 1. The solid curve in
Figure 4, representing the boundary of the set of admissible and budget feasible trades
of contingent claims in the market for g, is obtained using the characterization of the
equilibrium prices in (11-12).22 The equilibrium level of consumption for type g agents,
given by the point xg,A, corresponds to their preferred bundle on this curve. The equilib-
rium consumption level of type b agents (not in the ﬁgure) is then given by the highest
full insurance point in their budget set, where their income includes the revenue from
the sale of consumption rights.
Is the presence of some level of cross-subsidization an intrinsic feature of ALPT
equilibria? To answer this question, we examine how the equilibrium varies with the
initial distribution of consumption rights, as parameterized by α. Let us denote by β(α)
the equilibrium value of β associated to a given level of α in expression (12) of equilibrium
prices; analogously, let x(α) be the corresponding equilibrium consumption level. In the









incentive eﬃcient allocation characterized by the minimum level of subsidization from
agents of type g to agents of type b. More formally,
 
zg,zb 
is obtained as a solution of
the problem of maximizing the expected utility of type g agents, Ug(ω+zg), subject to the
22See the caption of the Figure for details.





s ≥ 0, i.e., that b is not subsidizing g. It is immediate to see, given the




the Rothschild and Stiglitz separating allocation whenever this is incentive eﬃcient, and




s) ≥ 0 is not binding) given by the incentive
eﬃcient allocation at which b’s welfare is minimal.23
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, limα→0 xi(α) = xi, for i ∈ {g,b}.
As shown in the proof of the Proposition in the Appendix, for each α > 0, the ALPT
equilibrium characterized by prices of the form (11-12) exhibits a positive subsidy from
the g types to the b types. The way in which type b agents receive a subsidy is through the
sale of consumption rights for market g. When α approaches 0, the initial distribution
of consumption rights is the most favorable to the type g agents, as they receive in the
limit the entire amount of the total initial endowment of consumption rights for market
g; hence the sale of such rights by the b agents will be the lowest, and the equilibrium will
be the incentive eﬃcient allocation
 
zg,zb 
where the subsidy to the b agents is minimal.
We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that, for the economies in which the Rothschild
and Stiglitz separating allocation is incentive eﬃcient, this allocation is decentralized
as an ALPT equilibrium with α = 0, and the equilibrium prices satisfy (12) with β =
limα→0 β(α) < (ξ
b/ξ
g). On the other hand, for the economies in which the Rothschild
and Stiglitz separating allocation is not incentive eﬃcient an ALPT equilibrium does
not exist when α = 0,24 but the sequence of ALPT equilibria allocations converges,
as α → 0, to
 
zg,zb 
, the allocation with the minimum level of subsidization from
agents of type g to agents of type b, and equilibrium prices in the limit satisfy (12) with
limα→0 β(α) = (ξ
b/ξ
g).
4.2.1 Welfare Properties of ALPT Equilibria
First of all we show that the structure of markets for consumption rights we have designed
does indeed solve the problem of decentralizing incentive eﬃcient allocations. Proposi-
tion 4 represents (an incentive constrained version of) the First Theorem of Welfare
Economics for economies with adverse selection:
Proposition 4 All ALPT equilibria are incentive eﬃcient.
Moreover, using the characterization of ALPT equilibria with α = 0 provided by
Proposition 3, it is straightforward to extend the second welfare theorem obtained for




is also the allocation induced by what is sometimes referred to as the Wilson-
Miyazaki pair of contracts.
24See footnote 16.
20allocation can be decentralized as an ALPT equilibrium with an initial distribution of
rights given by α = 0 and with transfers which are possibly dependent on the state but
not the agents’ type.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, for any incentive eﬃcient consumption allocation
(zg,zb) there exists a set of feasible transfers (tH,tL), such that (zg,zb) is an ALPT
equilibrium allocation when each agent receives the transfer (tH,tL), and α = 0.
4.2.2 The Implementation of ALPT Equilibria
While we have shown that by appropriately designing markets for consumption rights
incentive Pareto optimal allocations can be decentralized as Walrasian equilibria, such
markets might appear diﬃcult to implement in actual economies. The objective of this
section is to argue that, on the contrary, markets for consumption rights can be more
simply implemented when designed along the lines, e.g., of markets for pollution rights,
or of markets for the access to clubs. More speciﬁcally, this is the case if the enforcement
mechanism operates on insurance ﬁrms rather than consumers, linking the contracts
they may oﬀer to their holdings of appropriate amounts of trading rights. Moreover, the
implementation is simpliﬁed if only oﬀering contracts in the market for type g agents,
the high quality market in our set-up, requires holding of such rights and if units are
re-deﬁned so that every consumer is endowed with a single unit of the right to trade in
the market for g.25
We now illustrate how such a decentralization scheme may work and give rise to
the same equilibrium outcomes as the structure of markets considered in ALPT. There
are again two markets, one for the agents (declaring to be) of type b and one for those
(declaring to be) of type g. If a consumer chooses to trade in the market for b, he can sell
the right to trade in the market for g, at a price determined in equilibrium.Such rights are
purchased by insurance ﬁrms. To be able to sell a contract in the market for g a ﬁrm has
in fact to satisfy an enforcement constraint, which prescribes that the contract is backed
by an appropriate amount of trading rights. More precisely, the contract has to satisfy
an incentive constraint requiring that only type g agents prefer it to the consumption
level that can be attained in the market for b with the sale of the amount of trading
rights backing the contract. Each ﬁrm may then oﬀer a menu of contracts in the market
for g, indexed by the amount of rights backing them: the larger this amount the better
the contract, since the incentive compatibility constraint will be looser. No enforcement
constraint, on the other hand, operates on contracts oﬀered in the market for type b,
the low quality market. In this market ﬁrms are free to choose the speciﬁcation of the
contract, i.e., the net payment to the agent in each state, so as to maximize proﬁts.
25See Carlson et. al. (1993) and Ledyard and Szakaly (1994) for a discussion of the properties
of enforcement mechanisms in the market for pollution rights which make them easily and eﬀectively
implementable.
21The consumers trading in each market face then a given menu of contracts among
which they can choose, which at equilibrium coincides with the menu of contracts ﬁrms
are willing to oﬀer in the two markets. At a competitive equilibrium every agent chooses
to trade in the market designated for his type and markets clear. In particular, the
number of trading rights bought by ﬁrms operating in the market for g is equal to the
number of agents of type b in the economy, who all sell the right to trade in the market
for g they are endowed with.
It is possible to show that there is always a competitive equilibrium for this economy
where prices have the following properties: (i) the rights to trade in the market for g
have a positive price; (ii) each contract oﬀered in the market for b is priced fairly; (iii)
the price of any contract oﬀered in the market for g equals the sum of the value of the
contingent claims included in the contract, evaluated at the fair price qg,s = πg
s, s ∈ S,
and the market value of the trading rights backing the contract. At such prices, the type
b agents choose to fully insure in the market for b, and use the proceeds from the sale of
their right to trade in the market for g to attain a level of consumption which is higher
than the expected value of their endowment. Type g agents choose instead a partial
insurance contract in the market for g. This contract is backed by a smaller amount of
rights, and hence cheaper than the full insurance contract. In particular, we can also
show that the competitive equilibrium allocation is the same as the one obtained as the




, the incentive eﬃcient allocation which is preferred by the
type g agents; that is, the Rothschild and Stiglitz separating allocation when it is incen-
tive eﬃcient.
With the objective of exploring some strategic foundations for our notion of ALPT
equilibrium, we have also studied an extension of the deﬁnition of the core proposed by
Marimon (1988) (see also Boyd-Prescott-Smith (1988)) for adverse selection economies.27
Such notion is characterized by the fact that blocking coalitions cannot tax, only sub-
sidize agents outside the coalition, but otherwise agents of one type can separate at no
cost. It is fairly immediate to see that a single allocation is in the core according to
this notion, and is
 
zg,zb 
. But suppose instead that the high quality types (g in our
set-up) can form a coalition excluding the low quality types (b) only if they pay a given
amount C, which we can interpret as the cost of acquiring the ‘right’ to separate from
the low quality types (of course the allocation proposed by the deviating coalition must
also be incentive compatible). This clearly parallels the role of the distribution of the
endowment of consumption rights in ALPT. It can be shown that, by varying C, we
can obtain as core allocations the set of ALPT equilibrium allocations corresponding to
26See Proposition 3.
27It should be pointed out though that various other notions have been proposed and an agreements
has not yet been reached on what is an appropriate notion of the core for economies with adverse
selection.
22diﬀerent values of α.
5 Conclusions
We have studied in this paper how Walrasian markets work in economies with adverse
selection when exclusive contracts are available and whether their outcome is eﬃcient.
In particular, we have identiﬁed a form of externality as a potential problem for the
operation of Walrasian markets in this set-up. We have then shown that an enlarged
structure of markets, which includes markets for consumption rights, allows to internalize
this externality and hence to decentralize incentive eﬃcient allocations. All Walrasian
(ALPT) equilibrium allocations are incentive eﬃcient in this case. We have also shown
that when such enlarged set of markets is not available, a Walrasian (EPT) equilibrium
always exists but may fail to be incentive eﬃcient, and ineﬃciency is robust.
Our results have been derived for a class of simple insurance economies with adverse
selection where agents can be of two possible types, and the privately observed type of
each agent only concerns the probability structure of the idiosyncratic shocks aﬀecting
the agent. Such economies provide an important benchmark for the analysis of markets
and equilibria with asymmetric information, at least since the work by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). However, the equilibrium concepts we introduced can be extended to
more general classes of economies with adverse selection.
23Appendix
We omit the proof of Theorems 1 and 2, showing the existence of EPT and of ALPT
equilibria. We refer the interested reader to Bisin and Gottardi (2005).
Proof of Proposition 1. If, at a solution of the problem of maximizing a weighted aver-
age of the agents’ utility subject to (2-3) and (7), both incentive compatibility constraints
hold as equalities, under the assumptions made on agents’ preferences (in particular, the
single crossing property) we must have zg = zb. But then (7) implies that z lies on, or
below, the fair odds line for type b. Since the separating allocation is always preferred
by both agents to any point on this line, this cannot be a solution.
On the other hand, if only one of the two incentive constraints is binding, say the one
for type b (given by (3)), then the optimal level of zb is simply obtained by maximizing
Ub(ω +zb) over (7); thus it will always be at the full insurance point ωH +zb
H = ωL +zb
L
satisfying (7). The level of zg is then determined by maximizing Ug(ω + zg) subject
to (7) and (3), taking ω + zb as given at the full insurance level determined before.
It is immediate to see that the pair (zg,zb) is the same as the separating allocation
of Rothschild and Stiglitz. If we apply a symmetric argument when (2) is the only
constraint binding, we ﬁnd that no solution exists in this case (when zg is at the full
insurance level satisfying (7), no value exists for zb which also satisﬁes (7) and (2)).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let (zg,zb) be an arbitrary incentive eﬃcient allocation.
By Lemma 1, at an EPT equilibrium, prices of contingent commodities are necessarily
















going through, respectively, the points ω + zb and ω + zg, they will intersect at a single
point; call it   x. Since
 
s∈S πi




s  xs, i ∈ {g,b}, and (zg,zb) satisﬁes the






s (  xs − ωs) + ξbπ
b
s (  xs − ωs)
 
≤ 0,
which implies that a transfer (tH =   xH − ωH,tL =   xL − ωL) to all the agents is also
feasible.
We show next that (zg,zb) is the (unique in fact) EPT equilibrium allocation of the
economy when the agents receive the transfer t = (tH,tL). Suppose not. There exists
then another vector of net trades, say (ˆ zg,0) for g, that also lies in Z[(zg,0),(0,zb)], i.e. ˆ zg




s−ts) ≤ 0), and is such











0; thus (ˆ zg,zb) is also feasible, incentive compatible and Pareto dominates (zg,zb), a con-
tradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3. At any ALPT equilibria where prices are of the form (11-12)
24type b agents face a zero price for the rights for consumption in market b. Hence their
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The term on the right hand side is the income of a type b agent, given by the value of
his endowment of contingent claims, evaluated at qb = πb, plus the value of the amount
of consumption rights for market g the agents possesses, evaluated at p(b) = βπb. The















, s ∈ S,










Both sequences x(α) and β(α), giving the equilibrium consumption level and rights’
prices for diﬀerent values of α, lie in compact sets. Thus, they admit convergent subse-
quences; let ˆ x, ˆ β be their limit. On the basis of the above argument, If ˆ β = limα→0 β(α) is
strictly less than (ξ
b/ξ
g), the value of the subsidy converges to 0 as α → 0, so that xb(α)
converges to full insurance at fair odds, i.e. to type b’s component of the consumption
level at the Rothschild and Stiglitz separating allocation, xb,S = ω+zb,S. ¿From the ﬁrst
welfare theorem (Proposition 4) zb,S must be part of an incentive eﬃcient allocation,





On the other hand, if ˆ β = (ξ
b/ξ
g), the problem of agents of type g, (P
g
ALPT), in the
limit (for α = 0,β = (ξ
b/ξ
g)), reduces to the problem of maximizing Ug(ω + zg) (with
respect to zg,zb) subject to the resource feasibility and incentive constraints (1-3) (since




that the value of the subsidy to agents of type b in this case converges to a level which is
either positive or zero (but cannot be negative since it is strictly positive for all α > 0).
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is quite standard. Suppose not, i.e. there exists a
feasible, incentive compatible allocation (  zg,  zb) which Pareto dominates the equilibrium
allocation (zg
g,zb
b). Then, note that the following constitutes an admissible choice (i.e.,
that lies in Z) for agent i ∈ {g,b}: ˆ zi
i =   zi, ˆ zi
j = 0, ˆ ζ
i








ˆ zi], for j  = i. Therefore, given the fact that local nonsatiation holds, as shown in the
proof of Theorem 2 in Bisin and Gottardi (2005), it must be:
qg     z






[αω + ˆ z
g] > 0
25qb     z






[αω + ˆ z
b] > 0





gqg     z
g + ξ
bqb     z
b > 0.
Since (  zg,  zb) is a feasible allocation, (ξ
g  zg,ξ
b  zb) lies in the ﬁrms’ production possibilities’
set Y and, by the previous inequality, yields positive proﬁts. This contradicts the fact





proﬁts at the prices q, since its proﬁts equal zero.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let (zg,zb) be any incentive eﬃcient allocation. By Propo-
sition 2, there exists a set of feasible transfers (tH,tL) such that (zg,zb) is an EPT
equilibrium allocation for the economy under consideration when each agent receives a
transfer (tH,tL). Moreover, by Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, the economy where agents’
endowment equals ω + t has a unique EPT equilibrium (where the agents’ consumption
is given by (ω +zg,ω +zb)), coinciding with the Rothschild and Stiglitz separating allo-
cation for the economy with endowment ω+t. Since (ω+zg,ω+zb) is incentive eﬃcient,
from Proposition 3 it follows that it can be decentralized as an ALPT equilibrium with
α = 0 of the economy with endowments ω + t.
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the consumption level at the separating allocation, that is, xi,S = ω + zi,S; Ub and Ug
denote the indiﬀerence curves respectively of type b and g at this allocation. Agents of








for each s. Type g agents are
only partially insured, again at fair odds, so as to satisfy the type b incentive compatibility
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Figure 2: The Pooling Allocation. xP = ω+zP denotes the consumption level at the
pooling allocation, Ub and Ug the indiﬀerence curves of types b and g, respectively, at
the pooling allocation. Both types of agents are fully insured and consume the aggregate
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Figure 3: The Second Welfare Theorem. t = {tH,tL} denotes the transfer to the
agents, Ub and Ug the indiﬀerence curves of types b and g at the EPT equilibrium
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Figure 4: ALPT Equilibrium. xg,A denotes the ALPT equilibrium consumption level
for type g, while the solid curve depicts the boundary of the set of admissible and budget
feasible trades of contingent claims in the market for type g at the equilibrium prices. To
ﬁnd the boundary of this set we proceed as follows. At the prices (11-12), it is immediate
to see that the optimal choice of consumption rights for market g is at a full insurance
level: ζH(g)+(1−α)ωH = ζL(g)+(1−α)ωL. We can then solve this equation, together
with the incentive compatibility constraint (ii) in Z,
 
s∈S πb
su(ζs(g) + (1 − α)ωs) =  
s∈S πb
su(zg,s + ωs), for ζ(g) in terms of zg. Substituting the resulting expression into
the budget constraint in problem (P ALPT,g), and noting that zb = 0, for the type g
agents, while p(b) = 0, we obtain an equation whose only variable is zg, describing the
boundary of the set required.
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